Brutus No. 1 (Yates)
Short summary
Brutus, likely a pseudonym for Robert Yates, argues against ratifying the proposed U.S. Constitution in 1787. He questions whether the thirteen United States should become one large republic, asserting that any government adopted must be free and ensure full representation of the people.
Brutus cites Montesquieu and Beccaria, who argue that free republics can only succeed in small territories. In large republics, wealthy individuals pursue personal glory at the expense of the public good, and abuses become widespread. History supports this view—the Greek and Roman republics were small, and when they expanded, they became tyrannical.
Brutus explains that in an extensive republic, true representation becomes impossible. The territory would require so many representatives that government becomes unwieldy, yet too few representatives cannot adequately know or express the people's sentiments. The diverse climates, productions, interests, manners, and customs across the United States would create constant conflict in the legislature, preventing effective governance. Laws cannot be promptly executed across such vast distances. Without standing armies, which threaten liberty, the government must rely on citizens' confidence and respect. However, in a republic as large as the United States, people would not know their distant rulers and could not effectively hold them accountable or replace them. Brutus concludes:
It appears that a free republic cannot long subsist over a country of the great extent of these states. If then this new constitution is calculated to consolidate the thirteen states into one... it ought not to be adopted.
Detailed summary
Division into sections is editorial.
The fundamental question: Should the thirteen United States become one republic?
Brutus began his inquiry by posing a central question: whether the thirteen United States should be reduced to one great republic. He established common ground that any government adopted ought to be free, framed to secure the liberty of American citizens, and structured to admit full, fair, and equal representation of the people. The question then became whether such a government, constituted on these principles, could be practicable and exercised over the whole United States reduced into one state.
The wisdom of Montesquieu and Beccaria: Great thinkers and historical evidence against extensive republics
Brutus argued that respect must be paid to the opinions of the greatest and wisest men who had ever thought or written on the science of government. These authorities constrained one to conclude that a free republic could not succeed over a country of such immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants increasing in rapid progression as that of the whole United States. He quoted the baron de Montesquieu from Spirit of Laws:
It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory... In a large republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject...
The marquis Beccaria shared this opinion. Brutus noted that history furnished no example of a free republic anything like the extent of the United States. The Grecian republics were of small extent, as was that of the Romans. Both extended their conquests over large territories, and the consequence was that their governments changed from free governments to the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world.
Forms of government and the impossibility of adequate representation in large territories
Brutus explained that in every government, the will of the sovereign is the law. In despotic governments, the supreme authority being lodged in one, his will is law and can be easily expressed to a large extensive territory. In a pure democracy, the people are sovereign and their will is declared by themselves, requiring them all to come together to deliberate and decide. This kind of government cannot be exercised over a country of any considerable extent. In a free republic, although all laws are derived from the consent of the people, the people do not declare their consent in person but by representatives chosen by them.
In a large extended country, it is impossible to have a representation possessing the sentiments and integrity to declare the minds of the people without having it so numerous and unwieldy as to be subject in great measure to the inconveniency of a democratic government. The territory of the United States contained nearly three millions of souls and was capable of containing much more than ten times that number. It was not practicable for a country so large and so numerous to elect a representation that would speak their sentiments without becoming so numerous as to be incapable of transacting public business.
The problem of diverse climates, interests, manners, and customs
Brutus argued that in a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar. If not, there would be a constant clashing of opinions, and the representatives of one part would continually strive against those of the other. This would retard the operations of government and prevent conclusions that would promote the public good. Applied to the United States, this remark forbade that they should be one government. The United States included a variety of climates, with productions of different parts very variant and their interests consequently diverse. Their manners and habits differed as much as their climates and productions, and their sentiments were by no means coincident.
Executing laws: The danger of standing armies versus the need for citizen confidence
The laws could not be executed in a republic of an extent equal to that of the United States with promptitude. Magistrates must be supported in executing laws either by an armed force maintained at public expense or by the people turning out to aid the magistrate upon his command. In despotic governments and European monarchies, standing armies were kept up to execute commands, but they had always proved the destruction of liberty and were abhorrent to the spirit of a free republic. A free republic would never keep a standing army to execute its laws but must depend upon the support of its citizens. When a government receives its support from the aid of citizens, it must be so constructed as to have the confidence, respect, and affection of the people.
The loss of popular knowledge and control over rulers in extensive territories
The people would not be likely to have such confidence in their rulers in a republic so extensive as the United States. The confidence which people have in their rulers in a free republic arises from their knowing them, from their being responsible to them for their conduct, and from the power they have of displacing them when they misbehave. But in a republic of the extent of this continent, the people in general would be acquainted with very few of their rulers. The people at large would know little of their proceedings, and it would be extremely difficult to change them. The different parts of so extensive a country could not possibly be made acquainted with the conduct of their representatives. The consequence would be that they would have no confidence in their legislature, suspect them of ambitious views, be jealous of every measure they adopt, and not support the laws they pass. The government would be nerveless and inefficient, and no way would be left to render it otherwise but by establishing an armed force to execute the laws at the point of the bayonet.
Legislative inadequacy and the inevitable abuse of power by executive officers
In a republic of such vast extent as the United States, the legislature could not attend to the various concerns and wants of its different parts. It could not be sufficiently numerous to be acquainted with the local condition and wants of different districts, and if it could, it would be impossible it should have sufficient time to attend to and provide for all the variety of cases that would continually arise. In so extensive a republic, the great officers of government would soon become above the control of the people and abuse their power to the purpose of aggrandizing themselves and oppressing them. The trust committed to executive offices must be various and of magnitude, attended with great honor and emolument, so as greatly to interest men to pursue them. Such men would be ever restless in their pursuit and would use the power when acquired to gratify their own interest and ambition. It was scarcely possible in a very large republic to call them to account for their misconduct or to prevent their abuse of power.
Conclusion: The consolidating constitution ought not to be adopted
These were some of the reasons by which it appeared that a free republic could not long subsist over a country of the great extent of these states. If then this new constitution was calculated to consolidate the thirteen states into one, as it evidently was, it ought not to be adopted.