Federalist No. 10 (Madison)
Short summary
Madison addresses the problem of faction in popular governments. He defines faction as a group of citizens united by a common interest that is adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the community's interests.
Madison argues there are two methods of curing faction: removing its causes or controlling its effects. Removing causes requires either destroying liberty or giving all citizens identical opinions and interests. The first remedy is worse than the disease, since liberty is essential to political life. The second is impracticable because human reason is fallible and people naturally form different opinions and interests, especially regarding property.
Since the causes of faction cannot be removed, relief must be sought in controlling its effects. A pure democracy cannot cure faction because a majority can easily oppress the minority. A republic, however, offers a solution through representation and extended territory. Representatives refine public views, and a large republic contains more diverse interests, making it harder for any single faction to dominate.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.
Detailed summary
Division into chapters is editorial.
The danger of faction to popular governments
Madison opened his essay by addressing the people of New York, emphasizing that among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserved more careful examination than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.
The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice.
Madison argued that instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into public councils had been the mortal diseases under which popular governments everywhere perished. Although American constitutions had made valuable improvements on ancient and modern popular models, complaints were heard from considerate and virtuous citizens that governments were too unstable, that the public good was disregarded in conflicts of rival parties, and that measures were decided by the superior force of an interested majority rather than by justice and the rights of the minority.
Defining faction and two methods of curing its mischiefs
Madison provided a precise definition of the problem he sought to address.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens...who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens
Madison explained that there were two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: removing its causes or controlling its effects. He further divided the removal of causes into two approaches: destroying the liberty essential to faction's existence, or giving every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests. Madison compared the first remedy to abolishing air because it gives fire its destructive agencyâit would be worse than the disease.
Why the causes of faction cannot be removed
Madison demonstrated that the second expedient was as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as human reason remained fallible and people were free to exercise it, different opinions would be formed. The connection between reason and self-love meant that opinions and passions would influence each other. The diversity in human faculties, from which property rights originated, presented an insuperable obstacle to uniformity of interests. Madison identified the protection of these diverse faculties as the first object of government.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society.
Madison catalogued various sources of faction: zeal for different opinions concerning religion and government, attachment to different leaders, and other distinctions that divided mankind into parties and inflamed them with mutual animosity. However, he identified the most common and durable source as the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who held property and those without it formed distinct interests, as did creditors and debtors. A landed interest, manufacturing interest, mercantile interest, and moneyed interest necessarily grew up in civilized nations, dividing them into different classes with different sentiments and views.
Controlling the effects of faction: minority versus majority factions
Madison argued that enlightened statesmen could not always adjust clashing interests and render them subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen would not always be at the helm, and such adjustments often required consideration of indirect and remote factors that rarely prevailed over immediate interests.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.
Madison explained that if a faction consisted of less than a majority, the republican principle enabled the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. When a majority was included in a faction, however, popular government enabled it to sacrifice both the public good and the rights of other citizens to its ruling passion or interest. The great object was to secure the public good and private rights against such a faction while preserving the spirit and form of popular government.
Pure democracy versus republic: the advantages of representation
Madison distinguished between pure democracy and a republic. A pure democracy, consisting of a small number of citizens who assembled and administered government in person, could admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest would almost always be felt by a majority, and nothing would check inducements to sacrifice the weaker party. Such democracies had always been spectacles of turbulence and contention, incompatible with personal security or property rights, and as short in their lives as they were violent in their deaths.
The advantages of large republics and the Union over small republics
Madison concluded that a republic, through representation and extension over a greater sphere of territory, promised the cure for faction. The same advantage a republic had over a democracy in controlling faction was enjoyed by a large republic over a small one, and by the Union over the individual states. The extent and proper structure of the Union provided a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.